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Abstract
Acceptable analyticities, i.e. contradictions or tautologies, constitute problematic evi-
dence for the idea that language includes a deductive system. In recent discussion,
two accounts have been presented in the literature to explain the available evidence.
According tooneof the accounts, grammatical analyticities are accessible to the system
but a pragmatic strengthening repair mechanism can apply and prevent the structures
from being actually interpreted as contradictions or tautologies. The proposed data,
however, leaves it open whether other versions of the meaning modulation operation
are required. Novel evidence we present argues that a loosening version of the repair
mechanismmust be available. Our observation concerns acceptable lexical contradic-
tions that cannot be rescued if only a strengthening version of the pragmatic strategy
is available.
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1 Language logicality
Recent work in linguistics argues for the “logicality” of language. This is the
idea that the language system consists of 1) a computational device form-
ing complex concepts out of an inventory of basic concepts, and 2) an algo-
rithmic deductive system, i.e. a natural logic, with the ability to draw infer-
ences from these structures. These two components jointly determine the
set of usable expressions of natural languages. Chief evidence for this idea
comes from the ungrammaticality of some analytic sentences. Standard exam-
ples are presented below, from von Fintel (1993) and Chierchia (2013) respec-
tively.
(1) *Someone but John smokes.
(2) *There are any cookies left.
The established account of (1) (Von Fintel, 1993; Gajewski, 2008) is that the
restriction by the exceptive but John triggers an obligatory grammatical impli-
cature that the sentence is false without the exceptive. In an acceptable use of
an exceptive as in Everyone but John smokes this obligatory implicature derives
that not everyone smokes, and therefore predicts the inference that John does
not smoke. But in (1), the obligatory implicature corresponds to the proposi-
tion No one smokeswhich combined with the assertion that someone but John
smokes amounts to a contradiction. The account of (2) (Chierchia, 2013, ch. i)
leads to a contradiction in a similar way, though crucially assuming a con-
troversial extension of the logical vocabulary (see Abrusán, 2019 for relevant
discussion). The indefinite any is assumed to generate stronger alternatives.
These are obligatorily negated provided that they are not entailed by the pre-
jacent sentence. In a negatively oriented environment as in There aren’t any
cookies left, alternatives are then not negated and the sentence is shown to be
semantically equivalent to the variant without the indefinite. But in (2), alter-
natives are not entailed by the prejacent. They are consequently obligatorily
negated, generating the observed contradiction.
Problematic evidence for the logicality of language assumption comes
instead from the grammaticality of sentences that seem to verbalize contradic-
tions in classical logic, as in the examples below (similar data also exist with
tautologies). The account is related to work on the interpretation of accept-
able contradictions, in particular the type called “borderline contradictions”
in Cobreros et al. (2012) (see also Alxatib and Pelletier, 2011; Alxatib et al.,
2013).
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(3) It is raining and it is not raining.
(4) John is tall and not tall.
In the literature one finds two alternative explanations for the puzzling behav-
ior, i.e. for the fact that just some analyticities result in ungrammaticality. The
standard explanation (Chierchia, 2013; Gajewski, 2009, 2002; Fox and Hackl,
2006; Barwise and Cooper, 1981) argues that the logicality of language assump-
tion should be combined with a modular perspective. This assumes radically
unspecified logical forms (which Gajewski refers to as “logical skeletons”)
whence the contradictions in (3) and (4) cannot be accessed by the mecha-
nism assessing the grammaticality of structures. The observation is that such
contradictions are due to the nonfunctional vocabulary, to which the mech-
anism remains indifferent. Ungrammatical contradictions like (1) and (2) are
described as grammatically trivial since, as for instance Chierchia discusses,
they remain contradictory for arbitrary substitution of the lexical nodes. Gram-
matical contradictions like (3) and (4) are instead described as logically trivial
since they remain contradictory only for uniform substitution of the lexical
nodes. And a mechanism only accessing functional vocabulary is expected to
inhibit just grammatical contradictions.
In recent discussion another explanation has been proposed, in Del Pinal
(2019) (exploring an idea already expressed in Sauerland, 2014). According to
this account, the logicality of language assumption can be maintained while
rejecting the modularity vision. In particular, the idea is that the mechanism
can access the nonfunctional vocabulary, and can thus see the contradictions
in (3) and (4), but apragmatic repair strategyprevents the structures frombeing
actually interpreted as contradictions via application of a Rescale operator.
The proposal thus crucially builds on the various accounts (Stanley, 2007; Reca-
nati, 2010;Martí, 2006) assuming that ameaningmodulation operation (either
linguistically triggered by articulated constituents or as an effect of an interpre-
tation function informed by the utterance context) can change themeaning of
nonfunctional terms so as tomake classical contradictions and tautologies not
trivial. Crucially, the strategy is, however, not applicable to functional words
and the ungrammatical contradictions in (1) and (2) are unavoidable also on
this explanation (see Chierchia, 2019 for possible extensions).
In this paper we investigate the pragmatic repair strategy. In Del Pinal’s dis-
cussion, a strengthening version of the strategy is provided. Meaning modu-
lation is then obtained as a result of excluding non standard interpretations,
via specialization of meanings. As he notes, however, a less constrained, more
tolerant version of the strategy is also conceivable and this is assumed to be
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compatible with the spirit of his proposal. In our discussion, we first show that
the strengthening strategy works for the proposed examples, i.e. can change
the contradictory status of grammatical contradictions but is unable to res-
cue ungrammatical contradictions, in accordance with our intuitions. Second,
we note that the loosening version of the strategy, when suitably defined, can
achieve the same result.Then,we submit evidence that could only be explained
if the strategy is not restricted to the strengthening sort. In particular, we
present sentences that constitute nonfunctional contradictions but are judged
as acceptable. As we discuss, however, the strengthening version of the oper-
ator cannot change the contradictory status of our cases, which conflicts with
our intuitions.We then conclude that the only way tomaintain the logicality of
language assumption without adopting the modular perspective is to assume
that meaning modulation must be loosening in certain occasions.
2 The rescale perspective on language logicality
Del Pinal’s account assumes that the silent operator Rescale can be inserted
into the structure of sentences. Functional and nonfunctional vocabulary are
not distinguished for the logicality of language, in difference to the modular-
ity account. But like the modularity account, the rescale account also assumes
that only certain analyticities are perceived as ungrammatical.
In the version presented, the operator Rescale can only apply to lexical
terminals and furthermore can only strengthen the interpretation of the ter-
minal, much like the expressions typical or good do. The strengthening version
of pragmatic operations like Rescale are motivated by familiar cases like (5)
(Carston, 2002) in which the concept of bachelor does not merely refer to
marital status but maybe in addition to eligibility for marriage (e.g. excluding
catholic priests). Themodulatedmeaning is obtained via exclusion of logically
available interpretations.
(5) Chris wants to meet a bachelor.
Here and in the following, we assume, with Del Pinal, that predicates are auto-
matically given a literal interpretaion, related to what Cobreros et al. (2012)
call a “classical” interpretation, i.e. we assume that bachelor is true of any
unmarried adult male and raining is true if there is any liquid precipitation.1
1 We discuss this assumption further in the conclusion.
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Hence, we assume that the concept raining is also true in more borderline
cases of light rain. For example, when Rescale in the strengthening version
Del Pinal presents applies to the concept raining, the resulting interpretation
can be paraphrased as raining strongly. The account predicts that (6) should
be ungrammatical since it is contradictory, but (7) where Rescale applies is
not contradictory, and it is correclty predicted to be acceptable. Note that the
account not only correctly predicts the grammaticality of (6), but furthermore
predicts the interpretation of it correctly: It’s raining, but not very hard (or in
another typical way).
(6) *It is raining and it is not raining
(7) It is raining and it is not Rescale (raining)
The discussion of this case shows that the Rescale operator accounts for
grammatical contradictions, but we still need that insertion of Rescale does
not change the contradictory status in the case of ungrammatical contradic-
tions. Consider example (8) of an ungrammatical exceptive similar to the case
(1) presented above. We assume that (8) is interpreted on the basis of the log-
ical form in (9) (Gajewski, 2008). The operator ExhC applied to the prejacent
negates all of the alternatives in the set C that are logically stronger than the
prejacent. The set C itself is determined by association with focus (Rooth, 1985,
1992), where in particular it associates with the focus on ¬smart(x). The result-
ing interpretation of this case is shown in (10).
(8) *Some students but the smart ones smoke.
(9) ExhC (∃x (student(x) ∧ [¬ smart(x)]F ∧ smokes (x)))
(10) ∃x (student(x) ∧ ¬ smart (x) ∧ smokes (x) ∧ ¬∃x (student(x) ∧ smokes
(x))
Insertion of Rescale in the representation (9) doesn’t affect the contradictory
status of (8). If Rescale is applied to smart as in (11) the contradiction remains.
(11) ExhC (∃x (student(x) ∧ [¬ Rescale(smart)(x)]F ∧ smokes (x)))
(12) ∃x (student(x) ∧ ¬ Rescale(smart)(x) ∧ smokes(x)) ∧ ¬∃x (student(x)
∧ smokes (x))
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If Rescale applies to student as in (13), crucially this term is interpreted
rescaled in both places where it occurs in (14) and therefore the contradiction
remains also in this case.
(13) ExhC (∃x (Rescale(student)(x) ∧ [¬ smart(x)]F ∧ smokes (x)))
(14) ∃x (Rescale(student)(x) ∧ ¬ (smart)(x) ∧ smokes(x)) ∧
¬∃x (Rescale(student)(x) ∧ smokes (x))
The invariance of analyticity to the insertion of Rescale is a consequence
of the fact that the logical form structure can be seen as defining the func-
tion of predicate meaning in (15). The function yields a contradiction for any
P it applies to, with student and Rescale(student) being two special cases.
Crucially the architecture of interpretation in this case blocks Rescale from
applying to the bound occurrences of P in (15).
(15) λP ∃x (P(x) ∧ ¬ (smart)(x) ∧ smokes(x)) ∧ ¬∃x (P(x) ∧ smokes (x))
In his account, Del Pinal already discusses some differences between modu-
larity and rescale accounts (see e.g. Del Pinal 2019: 28–29), and suggests that
the latter should be preferred, both philosophically (i.e. in relation to blind-
ness to general knowledge and inferential abilities) and empirically (e.g. with
respect to contradictionswith variable co-binding of predicates). He also notes
that less constrained versions of a rescale account remain possible, other than
the one he develops, and that the empirical data he presents leave the account
underdetermined in this respect.
3 Broadening the rescale perspective on language logicality
3.1 An alternative loosening rescale: Previous data
Operations similar to Rescale, but more liberal, are found in various works in
lexical pragmatics. In standard accounts (Carston, 1997; Sperber and Wilson,
2008; Carston, 2002; Wilson and Carston, 2006), ad hoc concepts (Barsalou,
1983, 1992) are assumed to be created by virtue of two reciprocal pragmatic
operations, strengthening and loosening. A weakening version of the Rescale
operator, i.e. Rescale loosen, appears to be motivated by familiar cases like (16).
Since the geometric concept hexagonal is not true of the shape of France, the
proposal is that Rescaleloosen weakens the concept, similar to the overt roughly
or loosely speaking, as shown in (17), and hence (16) is judged true though being
“classically” and “strictly” false (Cobreros et al., 2012).
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(16) France is hexagonal.
(17) France is Rescaleloosen(hexagonal)
As we can see, the data discussed in the previous section, concerning the
grammaticality of just some analyticities, are compatible with the assumption
that Rescale is either only strengthening or only loosening, as well as with
Rescale being underspecified between Rescaleloosen and Rescalestrengthen.
Consider how example (6), a grammatical borderline contradiction, is
accounted for in a system that has only a loosening operator. As shown in (18),
if Rescaleloosen is inserted in the second conjunct in the scope of negation,
the contradiction isn’t resolved since it is impossible that it rains, but doesn’t
even loosely speaking rain. Instead Rescaleloosen must be applied in the first
conjunct, as in (19) and the resulting interpretation expresses that it is loosely
speaking raining, but not in a stricter sense.
(18) *It is raining and it is not Rescaleloosen(raining)
(19) It is Rescaleloosen(raining) and it is not raining
The account of ungrammatical contradictions is crucially unaffected by the
change from strengthening to loosening of the operator. Recall that the impor-
tant feature of that account was that in the ungrammatical cases the logical
form could be characterized as a function that applied to any predicate would
yield a contradiction. The function (15) yields a contradiction, for the lexi-
cal concepts student and Rescalestrengthen(student), but also for Rescaleloosen
(student) and any other predicate.
Before we present our evidence, note that an even less restrictive account
assumes general meaningmodulation as stated in (20). For instance the opera-
torModulate freely remaps predicatemeanings to other predicatemeanings
of the same type depending on the context.
(20) ModulateC(P) = Q for any predicate Q selected by C that is of the same
type as P
Such freemodulationwould need to be pragmatically constrained (inways dis-
cussed for instance in Recanati, 2010) since as it stands it make interpretation
so liberal that almost any sentence would be true regardless of the facts of the
world. Consider, for instance, that (16)with representation (21) would allow the
concept of hexagonal to be mapped to either hexagonal or to non-hexagonal,
and therefore would be true regardless of the shape of France.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/25/2021 09:33:33AM
via free access
8 pistoia-reda and sauerland
International Review of Pragmatics 13 (2021) 1–13
(21) France is Modulate(hexagonal)
But even this most liberal account predicts ungrammatical contradictions to
remain contradictory because the structure of logical form still would con-
strain modulate to apply only to the argument of a function such as (15)
that maps any predicate to a contradiction. In the following section, we argue
though that other cases shed more light on the nature of the rescale mecha-
nism required.
3.2 An alternative loosening rescale: New data
We submit the pair below as new evidence to advance this debate. In partic-
ular, we argue that this evidence shows that sometimes Rescale must be of
the loosening sort. This excludes that Rescale only strengthens the meaning
of terms. Empirically, our intuition is that the two sentences are unexpectedly
perceived as being grammatical (cf. footnote 2 for a crucial difference between
these two cases).
(22) Some female Greek kings come from a warm country.
(23) Some female Greek kings come from a windy city.
Obviously these sentences constitutenonfunctional contradictionsunder their
literal, classical interpretations. The two occurrences of the existential quan-
tifier range over inconceivable entities, making the intersections necessarily
empty in every possible world. Del Pinal’s account thus assumes that these
sentences will be rejected as unnatural unless the proposed pragmatic oper-
ator can rescue them by modifying the meaning of the relevant non logical
terms. As discussed in the account, formal analyticities are dispreferred if alter-
native acceptable and potentially informative structures are available. Then,
the prediction is that the operator should apply here, in whatever form neces-
sary, to avoid the contradictions. As we mentioned, we believe the submitted
acceptability to be evidence that in this case the operator applies toweaken the
meaning of the crucial terms. Indeed, if only Rescalestrengthen were available,
anunobservedunacceptability symmetrywould actually be predictedbetween
the reported sentences.
We begin by showing that the application of the strengthening version of
Rescale to the above sentences is insufficient. It does not change their con-
tradictory status. In particular, if we applied the operator to one of the two
predicates responsible for the generation of the contradictions, i.e. to the pred-
icate female or to the predicate king, we would merely obtain a specification
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of their meanings, which would produce no effect on the contradiction. And
application of Rescalestrengthen to the predicate Greek obviously would have
no effect on the generation of the contradiction. Thus, if the operator were
limited to Rescalestrengthen an unobserved unacceptability symmetry would
be expected. This is shown below. Note crucially that, these being scalar sen-
tences, we assume following standard grammatical accounts (Chierchia et al.,
2012; Fox, 2007) that the structures include an obligatory exhaustivity opera-
tor.
(24) a. ExhC (∃x Rescalestrengthen(female) Greek kings (x) ∧
come from a warm country (x))
b. ExhC (∃x Rescalestrenghen(female) Greek kings (x) ∧
come from windy city (x))
(25) a. ExhC (∃x female Greek Rescalestrengthen(kings) (x) ∧
come from a warm country (x))
b. ExhC (∃x female Greek Rescalestrengthen(kings) (x) ∧
come from windy city (x))
(26) a. ExhC (∃x female Rescalestrengthen(Greek) kings (x) ∧
come from a warm country (x))
b. ExhC (∃x female Rescalestrengthen(Greek) kings (x) ∧
come from windy city (x))
We now show that application of Rescaleloosen does change the contradictory
status of sentences. In particular, if applied to the predicate female, this oper-
ator remaps the literal content with another predicate which is more tolerant
and can be true of male individuals. If applied to the predicate king, the oper-
ator remaps the literal content with another predicate which can be true of
female individuals. Rescaleloosen surely can also be applied to both predicates
at the same time, with a similar result. The following is a possible representa-
tion after application of the operator, assuming the first mentioned possible
application.
(27) ExhS (∃x Rescaleloosen(female) Greek kings (x) ∧
come from a warm country (x))
(28) ExhS (∃x Rescaleloosen(female) Greek kings (x) ∧
come from a from windy city (x))
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Since, as we noted above, the Rescale account predicts a preference for
acceptable non trivial structures, the prediction is that Rescaleloosen will be
applied in this case to avoid the nonfunctional contradictions.2
4 Final remarks
In this paper we discussed the assumption that the language system may
include a deductive device to draw inferences from the structures. Evidence
in favor of this idea comes from the unacceptability of some analytic sen-
tences. However, the literature also presents the case of grammatical analytic
sentences. These are crucially nonfunctional analyticities.
In order to explain the puzzling behavior, i.e. the fact that only some analyt-
icities are unacceptable, while at the same time maintaining the logicality of
language assumption, two accounts have been presented in the literature. The
first account capitalizes on the nonlogical nature of the acceptable analytici-
ties, and assumes that the system assessing grammaticality cannot access the
nonfunctional vocabulary, thus beingblind to the analytic status of the relevant
sentences. In the particular version Gajewski presents, standard logical form
representations are substituted with “logical skeletons”. The second account
rejects the modularity perspective assumed in the first proposal and main-
tains that the deductive systemactually accesses thenonfunctional vocabulary,
though a pragmatic strategy then applies to rescue the nonfunctional analytic-
ities in crucial cases. This account builds on proposals concerning contextual
meaning modulations.
In this paper we focused on the pragmatic strategy. In the standard account
Del Pinal presents, the strategy is described as a strengthening device that spe-
cializes the meaning of non logical terms. He also mentions that in principle
loosening versions of Rescale can be conceived without seriously altering
the spirit of his proposal, though he does not elaborate. In our discussion, we
presented evidence showing that in some cases Rescale has to be of the loos-
ening sort, otherwise we could not avoid some contradictions to arise. Let us
2 As an additional observation, note that (22) while grammatical is, according to our intuitions,
infelicitous. This may be related to the fact that, when Rescaleloosen applies, this sentences
can be reduced to cases where the existential quantifiers range over non existent but con-
ceivable entities, like (i) and (ii) below, first presented in Pistoia-Reda (2017) (see also Magri,
2017).
(i) Some Greek kings come from a warm country.
(ii)Some Greek kings come from a windy city.
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note again that the type of analyticities that require loosening Rescale can be
described as lexical (as opposed to formal) analyticities, since their logical sta-
tus depends on the meaning contribution of content expressions. So clearly
a way to maintain a strengthening Rescale is by ignoring lexical analyticities,
thoughwe don’t think this limitation can bemotivated on a pragmatic account
à la Del Pinal.
Finally, consider how our conclusions depend on the assumption we intro-
duced in the discussion of example (5), namely that predicates are given “clas-
sical” meanings, in the specified sense (Cobreros et al., 2012). Here we did not
provide any specific argument in favor of this assumption. So, how would our
general argument be affected, though, if we abandon this assumption? Initially
it seems that then it would be possible to defend the view that only strengthen-
ing is available via rescale, against our main point in this paper. For example
consider an account of (22) if the basicmeaningof female could alreadybe very
loose, e.g. so as to include many male individuals. Then, even without assum-
ing the application of rescuing pragmatic strategies, the sentencewould not be
expected to be ungrammatical, but only predicted to be odd, which is the cor-
rect result.However, if a standard loose interpretation is assumed forpredicates
we would then have to add to this account that most uses of the expression
female are interpreted with an application of rescalestrengthen, e.g. to prevent
a sentence like (29) from having overly strong truth requirements.
(29) This person is not female.
Therefore it seems to us that abandoning the assumption that predicates auto-
matically receive classical interpretations is too costly, and does not seem to
support a plausible alternative. We then conclude that the point we raised in
this discussion, i.e. that Rescale must sometimes be of the loosening sort, is
not affected.
Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge support from Generalitat de Catalunya and EU
(grant 2018 bp 00070 - Marie Skłodowska-Curie cofund), dfg (grant sa 925/
12-2 with spp 1727 XPrag.de) and Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/25/2021 09:33:33AM
via free access
12 pistoia-reda and sauerland
International Review of Pragmatics 13 (2021) 1–13
References
Abrusán, Marta. 2019. Semantic anomaly, pragmatic infelicity, and ungrammaticality.
Annual Review of Linguistics 5(1): 329–351.
Alxatib, Sam, Peter Pagin and Uli Sauerland. 2013. Acceptable contradictions: Prag-
matics or semantics? A reply to Cobreros et al. Journal of philosophical logic 42(4):
619–634.
Alxatib, Sam and Francis Jeffry Pelletier. 2011. The psychology of vagueness: Borderline
cases and contradictions. Mind & Language 26(3): 287–326.
Barsalou, LawrenceW. 1983. Ad hoc categories. Memory & Cognition 11(3): 211–227.
Barsalou, Lawrence W. 1992. Frames, concepts, and conceptual fields. In E. Kittay and
A. Lehrer (eds), Frames, fields, and contrasts. New essays in semantic and lexical orga-
nization, 21–74. Hillsdale NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Barwise, Jon andRobinCooper. 1981. Generalized quantifiers andnatural language. Lin-
guistics and Philosophy 4: 159–219.
Carston, Robyn. 1997. Enrichment and loosening: complementary processes in deriving
the proposition expressed? Linguistische Berichte 8: 103–127.
Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communica-
tion. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 2013. Logic in Grammar. Polarity, free choice and intervention.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chierchia, Gennaro. 2019. On being trivial. Manuscript.
Chierchia, Gennaro, Danny Fox and Benjamin Spector. 2012. Scalar implicature as a
grammatical phenomenon. InC.Maienborn, K. vonHeusinger andP. Portner. (eds.),
Semantics: An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning, 2297–2331.
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Cobreros, Pablo, Paul Egré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij. 2012. Tolerant, classical,
strict. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 41(2): 347–385.
Del Pinal, Guillermo. 2019. Triviality and logical form. Noûs 53(4): 785–218.
von Fintel, Kai. 1993. Exceptive constructions. Natural Language Semantics 1(2): 123–
148.
Fox, Danny. 2007. Free choice and the theory of scalar implicatures. In U. Sauerland
and P. Stateva, Presupposition and implicature in compositional semantics, 71–120.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fox, Danny andMartin Hackl. 2006. The universal density of measurement. Linguistics
and Philosophy 29(5): 537–586.
Gajewski, Jon. 2002. L-analyticity and natural language. Manuscript.
Gajewski, Jon. 2008. npi any and connected exceptive phrases. Natural Language
Semantics 16(1): 69–110.
Gajewski, Jon. 2009. L-triviality and grammar. Handout.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/25/2021 09:33:33AM
via free access
analyticity and modulation 13
International Review of Pragmatics 13 (2021) 1–13
Magri, Giorgio. 2017. Blindness, Short-sightedness, and Hirschberg’s contextually-
ordered alternatives: A reply to Schlenker (2012). In S. Pistoia-Reda and F. Domanes-
chi (eds), Linguistic and psycholinguistic approaches on implicatures and presuppo-
sitions, 9–54. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Martí, Luisa. 2006. Unarticulated constituents revisited. Linguistics and Philosophy
29(2): 135–166.
Pistoia-Reda, Salvatore. 2017. Contextual blindness in implicature computation. Natu-
ral Language Semantics 25(2): 109–124.
Recanati, François. 2010. Truth-conditional pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Rooth, Mats. 1985. Association with focus. PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts at
Amherst.
Rooth, Mats. 1992. A theory of focus interpretation. Natural language semantics 1(1):
75–116.
Sauerland, Uli. 2014. Making fuzzy logic work for language. Semantics and Philosophy
in Europe 7.
Sperber, Dan and Deirdre Wilson. 2008. A deflationary account of metaphors. In
R. Gibbs, The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought, 84–106. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Stanley, Jason. 2007. Language in context: Selected essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wilson, Deirdre and Robyn Carston. 2006. Metaphor, relevance and the ‘emergent
property’ issue. Mind & Language 21(3): 404–433.
Downloaded from Brill.com01/25/2021 09:33:33AM
via free access
